State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions from February 22, 1979 by New York State Public Employment Relations Board
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Board Decisions - NYS PERB New York State Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) 
2-22-1979 
State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions 
from February 22, 1979 
New York State Public Employment Relations Board 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/perbdecisions 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the New York State Public Employment Relations Board 
(PERB) at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion in Board Decisions - NYS PERB by an 
authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact catherwood-
dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions from February 
22, 1979 
Keywords 
NY, NYS, New York State, PERB, Public Employment Relations Board, board decisions, labor disputes, 
labor relations 
Comments 
This contract is part of a digital collection provided by the Martin P. Catherwood Library, ILR School, 
Cornell University. The information provided is for noncommercial educational use only. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/perbdecisions/138 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
//2A-2/22/79 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-35 27 
BARATTA & SOLLEDER (GEORGE J. SOLLEDER, JR., 
ESQ., of Counsel) for Respondent 
WAGER, WINICK, GINSBERG, EHRLICH, REICH & 
HOFFMAN (JEROME H. EHRLICH, ESQ., of Counsel) 
for Charging Party 
On September 18, 1978, the Rockville Centre Union Free 
School District (District) filed a charge that the Rockville Centra 
Principals Association (Association) violated §209-a.2(b) of the 
Taylor Law in that it submitted a proposal for a nonmandatory 
subject of negotiation to a factfinder and refused to withdraw the 
proposal when the District demanded that it do so. The Association 
proposal is: 
"2. SALARIES. 
For the school year July 1, 1978 to June 30, 1979, 
members of the Association shall receive a salary increase 
equivalent to 1.20 percent of the increase granted to 
members of the Professional Teaching Staff for the same 
period. 
. For the school year July 1, 1979 through June 30,1980 
members of the Association shall receive a salary increase 
equivalent to ,1.15 percent of the increase granted to 
members of the Professional Teaching Staff for the same 
period. 
For the school year July 1, 19 8 0 to June 30, 19 81 
members of the Association shall receive a salary increase 
equivalent to 1.15 percent of the increase granted to 
In the Matter of 
ROCKVILLE CENTRE PRINCIPALS 
ASSOCIATION, 
Respondent, 
-and-
^ROCKV-ILLE__GEHTRE^UNXON_ FREE 
SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Charging Party. 
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members of the Professional Teaching Staff for the 
same period." 
The Association acknowledges that it submitted the proposal to the 
factfinder and that it would not withdraw the proposal despite 
the District's demand that it do so. It contends, however, that 
this conduct does not constitute an improper practice. 
THE RIGHT TO SUBMIT PROPOSALS FOR 
NONMANDATORY SUBJECTS TO A FACTFINDER 
In 19 74, this Board first determined that a party to nego-
tiations violates its duty to negotiate in good faith when, over 
the objections of the other party, it presses a proposal for a non-
mandatory subject into factfinding, Board of Higher Education, 
7 PERB 1(3028. In part, this position was based upon NLRB v. Borg-
Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958), in which the United States 
Supreme Court determined that a party may not press a proposal for 
a nonmandatory subject to the point of insistence. 
The correctness of this doctrine was reexamined in Monroe-
Woodbury Teachers Association, 10 PERB If302 9 (1977) . The majority 
of the Board reaffirmed the doctrine. Its reasoning was that as 
the negotiating process continues, subjects of peripheral concern 
must be removed if the parties are to reach agreement. Factfinding 
was seen as an important step in the elimination of extraneous 
demands. The parties should be willing to abandon proposals at 
factfinding unless they are vital to it. Thus, the refusal to 
withdraw a proposal from a factfinder despite the demand of the 
other party that it do so was seen as similar to the insistence 
that was before the court in Borg-Warner. Notwithstanding the 
concerns of a particular party, the Board ruled that as a matter 
of law, nonmandatory subjects of negotiation must be treated as 
Board - U-3527 -3 
peripheral subjects, saying, 
"We are persuaded that for a party to insist upon sub-
mission of permissive subjects to the factfinding 
process is an act that tends to frustrate the goal of 
the factfinder and the parties, to wit, an agreement." 
In a dissenting opinion, Member Klaus wrote that the Board majority 
was imposing a "mechanistic" test for whether a party was improperly 
insisting upon a demand while "[u]nder Borg-Warner the insistence 
is- s ubs tanrfctve-,— lying ±rr the imposition- of*the—precondirtion-to—the 
making of any agreement" (emphasis in original). She further 
stated that the majority doctrine was unwise because "factfinding 
is a continuation of the bargaining process" and the forcible 
elimination of nonmandatory subjects of negotiation at the fact-
finding stage would diminish the likelihood of the parties reachin 
"their own agreement through the give-and-take of the process as 
guided by a third party." 
Finding much merit in both opinions in Monroe-Woodbury 
Teachers Association, we have reexamined the question. 
The discussion of the Borg-Warner decision does not seem to 
be very useful except insofar as it establishes the principle that 
under certain circumstances a party must withdraw its proposal for 
a nonmandatory subject. The differences between the private and 
public sector in the negotiation processes and particularly in the 
use of third parties to assist in the resolution of disputes makes 
the specific analysis in Borg-Warner inapplicable here. The most 
relevant difference is the statutory basis for and the frequent us 
of factfinding under the Taylor Law. The framers of the Taylor 
Law contemplated that an informed public opinion would pressure th{2 
parties to a negotiation to make appropriate concessions. "The 
factfinding report and recommendations [were designed to] provide 
5614 
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a basis to inform and to crystallize thoughtful public opinion and 
1 
news media comment." In keeping with the design of its framers, 
§§205.4 and 209.3(b) of the Taylor Law authorize and direct this 
Board to appoint or retain factfinders. 
It appears that the report and recommendations of a fact-
finder are intended to be a pressure upon the parties to make 
-concessions-;—thusT the^submrssron^of ~a "propos-al™to—a- factfinder- rs: 
designed to solicit 'his assistance in pressuring the other party. 
It would be improper for a factfinder appointed or retained by 
this Board to pressure a party to make a concession involving a 
nonmandatory subject of negotiation. Similarly, it is improper 
for a party to insist that the factfinder do so. By refusing to 
withdraw from factfinding a proposal for a nonmandatory subject 
despite the demand of the other party that it do so, the first 
party violates its duty to negotiate in good faith. 
THE NEGOTIABILITY OF PARITY 
The contested proposal here is for indices of teacher 
salaries to principal salaries for the period of July 1, 1978 
through June 30, 1981. Thus, the salaries that would be paid to 
employees represented by the Association would be determined by 
the salaries yet-to-be-negotiated by the District and the employee 
organization representing teachers. This automatic mathematical 
tie-in of the salary schedule of one unit of employees to the 
yet-to-be-negotiated salary schedule of another unit of employees 
1 Governor's Committee on Public Employment Relations, Final 
Report, March 31, 1966, page 37. 
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of the same employer is a form of parity. This Board first dealt 
with the question of whether this form of parity is a mandatory 
subject of negotiation in City of Albany (Firefighters), 7 PERB 
if3079 (1974:) and by a two-to-one margin, we determined that it is 
not. The reason given was that by seeking to be a silent partner 
in the negotiations between the employer and a second unit, ±he 
2 
first unit was interfering with those negotiations. •_ - - - - - -
Parity was again considered by the Board in City of New York, 
10 PERB 1(3003 (1977) . The City of New York had entered into an 
agreement with its firefighters that it would grant them any wage 
increases that might be thereafter obtained by the policemen in 
negotiations. It reached similar agreements with the court 
officers and sanitation workers, except that their parity relation-
ship to the policemen varied from the one-to-one relationship 
specified in the firefighters' contract. As such, their agree-
ments are a clear precedent for the proposal in the case before 
us. In the New York City case, the City had resisted the police-
men's proposal for an increase exceeding that which had been 
given to the firefighters and the specified ratio to the agreements 
of the court officers and the sanitation workers. In justification 
2_ Our opinion did not deal with other forms of parity, such as a 
demand for benefits already obtained by other units or a demand 
for parity with the benefits to be paid to employees of a 
different employer. We have also distinguished between this 
form of parity and a demand for the reopening of negotiations 
should another unit of employees of the same employer obtain 
greater benefits in the future, IAFF Local 189, 11 PERB 1(30 87 
(1978). These other forms of parity do not interfere with the 
negotiation rights of employees in another negotiating unit. 
5616 
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of its position, it said that to grant the policemen's demand 
would require additional payments to the firefighters, the court 
officers and the sanitation workers which would cost the City 
about triple the amount that it would have to pay policemen for 
each dollar in excess of the firefighter settlement. 
The majority of this Board ruled that the City violated its 
duty to negotiate in good faith with the policemen by committing 
itself to parity clauses in the firefighter, court officer and 
sanitation worker contracts. It held that the parity clauses 
constituted interferences with the statutory negotiation rights of 
the policemen and were, therefore, illegal. Member Klaus dissented 
from that opinion, stating, inter alia, that it is beyond the 
authority of this Board to declare a parity clause illegal. Sub-
sequently, in Onondaga Community College, 11 PERB 1(3045 (1978), 
Member Klaus, while maintaining her opinion that parity is Slot a 
prohibited subject of negotiation, subscribed to the opinion that 
it is also not a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
In 1978, the Court of Appeals ruled that a contract clause 
providing for the continuation of contractual benefits after the 
expiration of the contract was valid, Niagara Wheatfield Adminis-
trators Association v. Niagara Wheatfield Central School District, 
44 N.Y. 2d 68. It reversed the determination of the Appellate 
Division that such a contract provision was void. The Appellate 
Division, in turn, had reversed the award of an arbitrator apply-
ing a provision of the expired contract. The effect of the Court 
of Appeals decision was to reinstate the arbitrator's award,which, 
it turned out, dealt with a "tie-in", which is another name for 
parity. The Court of Appeals stated (at Page 73): 
5617 
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"In the case before us, we must first observe 
that the tie-in provision alone is not offensive 
to public policy. In fact, a tie-in provision 
similar to that here presented was statutorily 
required until 19 71. (Education Law §3101, 
repealed 1971.)" 
We do not believe that the Court of Appeals has overruled 
our decision in City of New York that parity is a prohibited sub-
ject of negotiation. The specific question before the Court of 
Appeals was whether a proposal for a continuation of benefits 
clause was a prohibited subject of negotiation; not whether a 
parity clause was prohibited. The validity of the parity clause 
considered by the arbitrator was assumed by the parties in their 
arguments to the Court of Appeals and was not contested. There is 
no indication that the passing reference of the Court of Appeals 
to parity reflected any consideration of the interpretation of the 
3_ 
Taylor Law dealt with in our City of New York decision. Moreover, 
the repeal of Education Law §3101, referred to in the Court of 
Appeals opinion, supports our understanding of what is proper 
negotiation under the Taylor Law. As indicated in the memorandum 
This public policy has been considered by the courts and boards 
of other States as well. The Connecticut Supreme Court held 
that parity is a prohibited subject of negotiation in 
Firefighters Local 1219 v. Labor Board, 17l Conn. 342 (1976), 
370 A. 2d 952, 93 LRRM 2098, 2 PBC 1(20192. To the same effect, 
see decisions of the Massachusetts, New Jersey and Pennsylvania 
agencies: Medford School Committee and Medford Teachers 
Association, Mass. Case MUP-2349 (1977); City of Plainfield, 
N.J. Case 4 NJPER 1(4130 (1978) ; and Commonwealth of Pennsylvani 
PA. Case 9 PPER 1(9084 (1978). In earlier cases, the agencies 
of Michigan and Wisconsin reached a contrary conclusion, Matter 
of City of Detroit, Mich. Case No. C-72A-1 (1972), appeal dis-
missed as moot, City of Detroit v. Killingsworth, Michigan 
Court of Appeals, 84 LRRM 2627; and West Allis Professional 
Policemen's Protective Association, Wisconsin decision No. 
12706 (1974) . 
5^  618 
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4 
of the State Senate Committee on Rules, the parity provision, 
along with other mandated salary schedules, was repealed because 
it was inconsistent with the Taylor Law requirement that, in the 
future, employees would "receive that compensation obtained 
through the collective bargaining process." 
We adhere to our opinion in City of New York and we deter-
mine that the Association violated its duty to negotiate in good 
faith by refusing to withdraw from factfinding its proposal for 
parity when the District demanded that it do so. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER the Association to withdraw its 
proposal for parity. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
February 23, 1979 
^£^>^/f, jU^r-. 
Harold ,R. Newman, Chairman 
4 See New York State Legislative Annual 19 71, pages 51-52 
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DISSENTING OPINION OF MEMBER KLAUS 
In my dissenting opinion in City of New York, 10 PERB 1(3003 (1977) , I 
stated my view that the inclusion in a collective bargaining agreement of a 
parity provision similar to that here involved did not constitute an improper 
practice. It was my view, for the reasons there expressed, that the pro-
_vision_ in_ques:tio:n did-no-L-violate-any -terms-of-the—statute-or-of#end—against— 
public policy. Unlike the majority, I read the decision of the Court of 
Appeals in the Niagara-Wheatfield case as a direct and clear statement that 
such a provision, particularly in the content of the underlying authority 
imposed upon public employers under the Taylor Law, does not contravene .r'A 
public policy. The Court plainly saw that issue as a preliminary question of 
law before approaching the broader issue in the case. The majority comment 
on the Court's reference to the prior requirement of the Education Law is to 
be read, it would appear to me, as meaning that there was no longer a need for 
a statutory requirement for a tie-in provision similar to that here presented 
for the reason that the scope of bargaining permitted by the Taylor Law 
accomplished the same purpose as the Education Law and, therefore, made the 
tie-in provision of the Education Law unnecessary. 
The case before us presents for the first time the question whether the 
submission to fact finding by one party over the objection of the other of a 
tie-in provision constitutes an improper practice within the meaning of 
§209-a.l(d). As the majority concludes that the demand in question is a non-
mandatory one because it contravenes public policy, it has sustained the 
charge. In view of my position that the demand is not unlawful, and because 
it deals with the subject of salaries, which is plainly within the ambit of 
5620 
negotiability described by the Taylor Law, (§§201.4 and 204.3), I would find 
that the Association's refusal to withdraw the proposal upon the demand of the 
District does not violate the Act. 
Accordingly, I would dismiss the charge. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
February 23, 1979 
j f r ^ . AX<L*st<L~^ 
Ida Klaus , Member 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LAKELAND CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
OP SHRUB OAK, 
Employer, 
-and-
LAKELAND CAFETERIA ASSOCIATION, 
#2B-2/22/79 
BOARD DECISION AND 
• ORDER 
_Jlasja_N©,.^J^lM^_ 
Petitioner, 
-and-
LAKELAND SCHOOL UNIT, WESTCHESTER CHAPTER 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 860, 
Trit'e'rve'rior 
STEYER & SIROTA, for Employer 
JOSEPH D. ERRICO, for Petitioner 
GRAE & ROSE, for Intervenor 
On April 20, 1978, the Lakeland Cafeteria Association (LCA) 
filed a petition for certification as a representative of a unit 
of cafeteria workers employed by the Lakeland Central School 
District of Shrub Oak, The unit is an existing one and has 
been represented by the Lakeland School Unit, Westchester Chapter 
Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 860 (CSEA). CSEA 
was permitted to intervene in the proceeding. 
CSEA has filed exceptions to the order of the Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation that there be 
an election in the existing unit. In its exceptions, CSEA contend^ 
5622 
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that the petition should have been dismissed because: 
1) LCA is a management dominated organization; 
2) LCA's petition is not supported by an 
adequate showing of interest; 
3) LCA is not an employee organization as 
that term is defined by the Taylor Law; 
and 
'v.'. 4) An existing contract bars the LCA petition. 
The director considered the four arguments presented by the ex-
ceptions and rejected them. We affirm the decision of the 
director .-for the following reasons: 
1. The hearing officer properly excluded evidence that might 
have supported CSEA's allegation that LCA is a management 
dominated organization. We have long held that an allegation 
that a union is dominated by an employer will not be considered in 
a representation proceeding. Such an issue can be presented to 
the Board only by an improper practice charge.— 
2. The allegation that the showing of interest is in-
adequate contends that it consists of 
"the names and addresses of individuals 
without any statements contained thereon 
designating as collective bargaining 
agent or negotiating representative for 
the alleged members of the petitioner." 
A review of the file of the director reveals that the petition was 
supported by evidence of current membership in LCA. Section 
201.4(b) of the rules of this Board specifically provides that 
such evidence is acceptable as a showing of interest. 
3. The basis of CSEA's exception directed to the status 
1 See CSL §209-2.1(b) and •State of New York, 2 PERB U3070 (1969); 
Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority., 6" PERB H3070 (1973). 
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of LCA. as an employee, organization is that it is prepared to 
admit to membership any cafeteria employee, be he a "Democrat", 
"Republican" or "Communist." This, according to CSEA violates 
§201.5 of the Taylor Law and §105 of the Civil Service Law. 
Section 201.5(a) of the Taylor Law provides, in part, that an 
organization is not an "employee organization," and thus not 
authorized to represent public employees, if membership in it is 
prohibited by §105 of the Civil Service Law. Section 105 bars 
persons who advocate the violent overthrow of the United States 
or any state or any political subdivision thereof from public 
employment. Section 105 also declares that membership in the 
communist party is prima facie evidence that the member is such a 
person. 
To the extent that §105 of the Civil Service Law is consti-
tutional,— §201.5 of the Taylor Law might preclude an organi-
zation, such as the Communist party, that advocates a violent 
overthrow of the United States from being deemed an employee . ... 
organization. In no event, however, would it require the dis-
qualification of an otherwise qualified employee organization by 
reason of the fact that it does not bar from membership in it 
those who may be members of the communist party. 
4. In support of its allegation that the LCA petition is 
barred by a contract, CSEA relies upon a memorandum of under-
2 Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
Contemporaneous with the enactment of the Taylor Law, 
aspects of this law were declared unconstitutional. 
5624 
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standing covering 1977-79 which was prepared on March 6, 1978. 
That memorandum was never executed by any party and its terms have 
not been implemented. The Director ruled that "an unsigned memo 
does not satisfy the requirements of a contract bar, and there-
fore, the petition is timely." We agree..2. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that an election by secret ballot 
_._ be held under the supervision of the Director among the 
employees in the unit described in his decision who were 
employed on the payroll date immediately preceding the 
date of this decision. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the employer shall submit to us 
as well as to LCA and CSEA, within 7 days from the 
receipt of this decision, an alphabetized list of 
employees in the negotiating unit set forth in the 
Director's decision who were employed on the date 
immediately preceding this decision. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
February 22, 1979 
' Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
3 Farmlngdale UFSD, 7 PERB U3073 (1974) 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
STATE OF NEW YORK, UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, 
Employer, 
-and-
NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT EMPLOYEES 
#20-2/22/79 
ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 710, SEIU, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and-
THE CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
BOARD DECISION AND 
ORDER 
-eAS-E-Nos-.—C=-r7-2-2/-
C-1724/ 
C-1725 
ROEMER & FEATHERSTONHAUGH, ESQS., 
(STEPHEN J. WILEY, ESQ., of Counsel), 
for the Intervenor 
WILLIAM R. PITASSY, ESQ., for Petitioner 
HOWARD A. RUBENSTEIN, ESQ., for the Employer 
This matter comes to us on a motion of the Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) 
for an order revoking the certifications heretofore issued to the 
Ninth Judicial District Court Employees Association Local 710, 
SEIU, AFL-CIO (petitioner). 
The three petitions were filed on July 3, 19 78. Petitions 
C-1722, C-1724 and C-1725 are for representation of employees of 
the Unified Court System of the State of New York who work in 
courts servicing the City of White Plains, the County of Rockland 
and the County of Westchester, respectively. The three petitions 
name the petitioner as the Ninth Judicial District Court Employees 
Association and separately note its affiliation with Local 710 
Board - C-1722/C-1724/C-1725 -2 
SEIU, AFL-CIO. The showing of interest supporting the petitions, 
however, merely specified support for SEIU. A notice of election 
in each of the three petitions was issued on October 25, 19 78. It 
specified that there would be an election between CSEA and the 
Court Employees Local 710, SEIU, AFL-CIO. Petitioner was also 
identified on the ballot as Court Employees Local 710, SEIU, AFL-
C-1722 
17 
13 
6 
7 
0 
C--1724 
51 
43 
13 
30 
0 
C-1725 
177 
132 
51 
77 
4 
CIO. 
The three elections were by mail ballot. Ballots were mailed 
on November 6, 1978. All ballots received at the Post Office by 
9:00 a.m. November 27, 1978 were counted on that day. The results 
of the election were: 
Number of Eligible Voters 
Valid Votes Cast 
Votes Cast for CSEA 
Votes Cast for Petitioner 
Votes Cast against Both 
On July 31, 19 78, the American Federation of State, County 
and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), with which CSEA had been affili-
ated since April 21, 1978, filed a charge against SEIU with the 
AFL-CIO complaining that the petitions constituted a raid upon it 
in violation of Article XX of the AFL-CIO Constitution. A deter-
mination sustaining the charge was issued on November 10, 1978. 
The record contains a document in the form of a letter from SEIU 
to petitioner dated November 22, 1978 stating that SEIU had 
revoked petitioner's charter. The record contains another docu-
ment in the form of a letter from SEIU to the Board dated November 
27, 19 78, which purports to inform this Board of the revocation of 
Board - C-1722/C-1724/C-1725 -3 
petitioner's charter. No such letter was received by this Board. 
After the election, CSEA filed objections to conduct affect-
ing the results of the election. The basis of the objection was 
that SEIU could not accept certification by reason of the deter-
mination in the Article XX case. CSEA argued that "PERB should 
not certify an employee organization where such organization will 
ultimately—be required^ tO""~dlBclaim"any""±n"texe"sLt"-±n—rep:re"S3"h"txiFg~~ 
the employees in the unit." Petitioner's answer to the objections 
was received on December 5, 1978. The answer was that Article XX 
is an internal proceeding of the AFL-CIO which "does not provide 
the basis of resort to court or other legal proceedings to settle 
disputes arising under the Article." In this answer, petitioner 
continued to identify itself as the "Ninth Judicial District 
Court Employees Association, Local 710, Service Employees Inter-
national Union, AFL-CIO." 
On December 7, 1978, at a time when we had no knowledge of 
the revocation of petitioner's charter as a constituent unit of 
SEIU, we accepted petitioner's argument that Article XX is an 
internal proceeding of the AFL-CIO and dismissed CSEA's objections 
regarding the election and certified the Ninth Judicial District 
Court Employees Association, Inc., Local 710, SEIU, AFL-CIO in 
the three units. 
Subsequently, AFSCME brought a noncompliance proceeding 
before the AFL-CIO in which it charged SEIU with failure to comply 
with the earlier determination. The record shows that on January 
17, 1979, during the course of that proceeding, AFSCME first 
learned of the letter informing petitioner that its charter from 
SEIU had been revoked and of the letter ostensibly mailed to this 
3oard informing it of the situation. This newly discovered evi-
' 562 
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dence is the basis of the motion now before us. 
In its reply, petitioner contends that the letter informing 
it of the revocation of its charter could not have come into Its 
possession prior to the election. Accordingly, the disaffiliation 
must be deemed to have occurred after the election was completed. 
It argues further that, "the Association's reply did not deny the 
fact of the disaffiliation." 
The employer takes no position on the motion. 
DISCUSSION 
We conclude that the certifications issued on December 7, 
19 78 to the Ninth Judicial District Court Employees Association, 
Local 710, SEIU, AFL-CIO were "improper In that they went to an 
organization that no longer existed. Indeed, that organization 
had not existed on November 27, 19 78, the date when the ballots 
were counted. And contrary to the statement in petitioner's reply 
to the motion before us, its answer (dated December 5, 1978) to 
CSEA's objections to the conduct affecting the results of the elec-
tion did deny the fact of disaffiliation, thus misrepresenting its 
status to this Board. It did so by continuing to identify the peti 
1 
tioner as an affiliate of SEIU. Had the situation been disclosed 
to us by December 7, 1978, we would not have certified petitioner 
in the three units. Accordingly, we will revoke the certifications 
Information regarding the revocation of petitioner's charter 
should have been called to the attention of the voters immediately 
It is irrelevant whether the failure to do so is attributable to 
One may entertain additional suspicions regarding the November 
•27, 19 78 letter addressed to this Board but never received by 
it and the timing of the November 22, 19 78 letter (twelve days 
after the determination in the Article XX proceeding) informing 
petitioner of the revocation of its charter. 
Board - C-1722/C-1724/C-1725 -5 
the Ninth Judicial District Court Employees Association or to 
SEIU; they had a joint responsibility to inform the voters as to 
the true identity of the organization appearing on the ballot. 
Had this significant information been communicated promptly,the 
results of the election might have been different. Accordingly, 
we set aside the elections. 
—
l
— ~The~D±re~c'i:ar~i^~^'WaTxc^^i^I^m^t^'PYactic^ and Representatic 
is directed to hold an election in each of the units for which a 
new showing of interest is submitted by March 30, 1979 on behalf 
of the Ninth Judicial District Court Employees Association. In 
those units for which no new showing of interest is submitted by 
that date on behalf of the Ninth Judicial District Court Employees 
Association, the petitions will be dismissed. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the certifications herein be, 
aaS they-hereby are,, revoked. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
February 23, 19 79 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
^U. / C ^ u ^ 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randies, Member 
VUG*» 
n 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2D-2/22/79 
In the Matter of 
VILLAGE OF JOHNSON CITY, 
Respondent, 
-and-
JOHNSON CITY FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION, 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASES NOS 
LOCAL 921, AFL-CIO,.IAFF, 
Charging Party. 
U-3357 
U-3358 
-U-3-35-9-
U-3 360 
U-3361 
U-3417 
BALL & McDONOUGH, P . C , for Charging Party 
PETER PIRNIE, for Respondent 
Case No. U-3417 was brought by the Johnson City Firefighters 
Association, Local 921, AFL-CIO, IAFF (Local) against the Village 
of Johnson City. It is before us on exceptions filed by both 
parties to those findings of the hearing officer's decision that 
are against them. The hearing officer dismissed seven of nine 
allegations made by the Local and found merit in two. 
Cases U-3357 and U-3363 were brought by the Village against 
the Local. In part, they share the same record as Case No. U-3 417 
These cases come to us under §204.4 of our rules without any 
report or recommendation of a hearing officer. 
We have consolidated all cases for purposes of decision. 
jCHARGE OF THE LOCAL 
Case U-3417 
On July 13, 1978, the Local filed a charge alleging that the 
Village violated §209-a.l(a), (b) and (d) of the Taylor Law. The 
learing officer found a violation of §209-a.l(d) in that the 
Village's negotiator, Dr. Peter Pirnie, was not prepared effec-
1
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because the mere filing of a charge is not an improper practice. 
In its exceptions, the Local argues that a violation exists 
because the charging party's motivation in filing the charges was 
to delay negotiations. The record does not support this argument 
of improper motivation on the part of the Village. 
The fifth and sixth allegations — refusal to provide 
information — sustained by the Hearing Officer 2_ 
— -These a-1-legations -are—that^ the—Viil-age—faiied^to—provx^de-thre' 
Local directly and through its negotiator with certain information 
it needed for negotiations. The hearing officer found that the 
Village refused to negotiate in good faith in that it did not 
provide relevant information. The first piece of information 
sought by the Local was the details of a work schedule that was 
proposed by the Village for negotiation.. An incomplete version of 
the schedule was given to the Local on April 5, 1978. The Local 
was also told that it had been given the details of the same 
proposed work schedule three years earlier. The hearing officer 
ietermined that the Village did not supply sufficient information 
about its proposed work schedule to the Local and that its nego-
tiator was not sufficiently prepared to do so. The record supports 
these determinations. 
The second piece of information sought by the Local was whether 
the Village would accept a grievance arbitration award that had 
Deen rendered on March 8, 1978, which directed the Village to try 
to augment its staff. The Local asserted that it needed this 
information to formulate its wage demands. 
2 No exceptions were directed to the hearing officer's disposi-
—
 tion of the third and fourth allegations. 
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tively to negotiate his own proposals made in behalf of the Village. 
He dismissed the charge in all other respects. 
The first allegation — refusal to negotiate 
— dismissed by the Hearing Officer 
The first allegation of the charge is that the Village refused 
to negotiate between December 1977 and March 8, 1978. The hearing 
officer dismissed this aspect of the charge as untimely since the 
ivents occurrlfd~more~than-four"months~bef6re the fTling of" the 
charge. He did consider the events based on the respondent's 
alleged conduct occurring within the timely period. 
In its exceptions, the Local argues that, although the alleged 
improper conduct occurred before March 8, 1978, it was not aware 
of the impact of that conduct until March 19, 197 8. On that date, 
the Village refused a request of the Local to extend the contract 
that was due to expire on May 31, 1978. The Local asserts that it 
first became concerned by the Village's refusal of the extension 
that its conduct before March 8 had made a settlement by May 31 
mlikely. That allegation is not established on this record. The 
refusal of March 19, 19 7 8 does not extend the Local's time in which 
to file a charge complaining about events that occurred before 
Vlarch 8, 19 78 and of which it had immediate knowledge. 
Accordingly, we affirm the hearing officer's dismissal of this 
allegation of the charge. 
The second allegation — the filing of a charge by the Village 
— dismissed by the Hearing Officer 
The second allegation is that the Village improperly submitted 
charges in Cases U-3357 and U-3363 for the purpose of delaying 
1 
legotiations. The hearing officer dismissed this allegation 
1 Those charges were filed to question the arbitrability of 
matters raised by a petition for interest arbitration. 
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The hearing officer determined that both items of information 
were needed by the Local. Relying upon our decision in City of 
New York, 9 PERB 1(3031, he concluded that, 
"An employer must provide, when requested, 
relevant information sufficient to permit the 
other side to analyze the proposals it has 
made or to prepare counter proposals of its 
own. " 
We --affirm—the—hearingoff ice-r-J-s-GonGiusions—on- -these—aiiegati-ons^— 
The seventh allegation — authority of negotiator 
— dismissed by the Hearing Officer 
The seventh allegation is that the Village failed until 
March 27, 1978, to empower its negotiator to reach an agreement. 
The Local excepts to the hearing officer's dismissal of this 
allegation. It argues that it was prevented from proving this 
allegation by the hearing officer, who ruled that it could not see 
notes being used by a Village witness. According to the Local, if 
it had been able to see those notes, it would have been able to 
prove this allegation in the cross-examination of the Village 
witness. This argument is also the basis of an exception directed 
to the hearing officer's conduct of the hearing. We conclude that 
the Local was not prejudiced by the hearing officer's ruling. The 
notes which the witness had before him merely contained dates to 
aid his recollection and did not relate to his authority to enter-: 
into agreements with the Local. Moreover, the record clearly 
supports the hearing officer's determination that the Village's 
negotiator was sufficiently empowered before March 27, 1978, to 
=nter into agreement as indicated by the fact that he agreed to 
several matters before that date. 
!
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Allegation of improper conduct of hearing officer 
— refusal to permit amendment of the charge 
The Local, in its exceptions, argues that the hearing officer 
committed reversible error by refusing the Local's request to 
amend its charge to include evidence of conduct transpiring during 
August 1978. The hearing officer ruled that the new allegations 
could not be considered during that particular day's proceedings. 
The amendment of a charge is normally a matter of discretion. 
Here, the hearing officer exercised his discretion properly 
consistent with due process. 
Exception directed to dismissal of alleged violation 
of §209T-a.l(a) and (b) 
The Local argues that the hearing officer improperly dismissed 
the §209-a.1(a) and (b) charges. The hearing officer found the 
record devoid of evidence that the Village's conduct was intended 
to interfere with the representation rights of the Local or that 
it dominated or interfered with the administration of the Local 
for the purpose of depriving it of such rights. The record 
supports his determination. 
CHARGES OF THE VILLAGE 
Case U-3357 
The charge of the Village is that the Local prematurely 
declared impasse. The parties first met on March 4, 1978, at 
3_ Section 204.1(d) of our Rules provides: 
"The Director or hearing officer designated by the 
Director may permit a charging party to amend the charge 
before, during or after the conclusion of the hearing 
upon such terms as may be deemed just and consistent 
with due process..." 
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vhich time they discussed ground rules for negotiations and the 
Local presented its demands. The Village presented its proposals 
luring the next negotiation session held on March 8. During the 
lext session, on March 16, the Local's proposals were explored and 
iiscussed. At that point, the Local declared an impasse. 
4 
In Matter of Bellport Teachers Association, we held that the 
ieclaration of impasse before the demands of the parties have 
actually been considered is premature. Here, the Local had failed 
5 
to negotiate in good faith because it declared an impasse pre-
maturely. This was a violation of §209-a.2(b) of the Taylor Law. 
Drdinarily, we would not permit interest arbitration to proceed 
jintil the parties have first attempted to reach an agreement 
i 
through substantial negotiation. Here, however, this course would 
De inappropriate. The record indicates that a PERB-appointed 
nediator met with the parties on March 29. The parties then met 
without him on March 30, April 3, April 5 and April 10, as well 
as on other occasions. During these meetings, the parties did in 
fact attempt to reach agreement. Thus, the Local's failure to 
negotiate in good faith before declaring impasse is not attribut-
able to the parties' subsequent unsuccessful efforts to reach 
agreement. 
4j 6 PERB 1(3018 (1973) . 
5 See Mt. Vernon , 11 PERB 1(3095 (1978) . 
6 Town of Haver s t r a w , 9 PERB 1(3063 ( 1 9 7 6 ) . 
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U-3358 and U-3361 
These charges allege that the Local misstated the Village's 
position in its petition to PERB requesting interest arbitration. 
Charge U-3358 also alleges that the Local submitted a new salary 
proposal in its petition for interest arbitration. 
The charge that the Local misstated the Village's position in 
its interest arbitration petition does not constitute an improper 
practice, as the petition is merely a procedural step. The Village 
can restate what its position is in its response to the petition 
for interest arbitration. The allegation that the Local submitted 
a new salary proposal in its petition is not supported by the 
evidence. 
U-3359 and U-3360 
These charges allege that the Local submitted nonmandatory 
subjects to arbitration. The contract that expired May 31, 197 8 
contained a clause specifying the unit composition and another 
providing health insurance benefits for retirees. Neither of 
these clauses dealt with mandatory subjects of negotiation. In its 
petition for interest arbitration, the Local stated that the parties 
had agreed to retain the clauses. The Village denies that it 
reached such an agreement and complains that the Local was improp-
erly insisting upon the negotaition of nonmandatory subjects. The 
record does not clearly establish the charge, as the Local's con-
duct is as consistent with a misunderstanding of the Village's 
position as it may be with improper insistence.: 
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NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that: 
• 1. In Case No. U-3417, the Village negotiate in good 
faith with the Local by providing the information re-
quested and by adequately explaining its negotiation pro-
posals. In all other respects, this charge be dismissed. 
2. In Case No. U-3357, the Local cease and desist from 
declaring impasse in negotiations prior to the time when 
the respective proposals of the parties have been con-
sidered. 
3. In Case Nos. U-3358, U-3359, U-3360 and U-3361, the 
charges be dismissed. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
February 23, 1978 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
U<tJ=5t. 
David C. R a n d i e s , Meraoer 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2E-2/22/79 
In the Matter, of the : 
WESTMORELAND NONINSTRUCTIONAL EMPLOYEES'
 : 
SERVICE ORGANIZATION, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, BOARD DECISION 
: \ AND ORDER 
Respondent,. 
-upon-the-Ghairge-of^ V-ioiati-on of -Seetion-'21-0—1 -GASE—NO—D-0172-
of the Civil Service Law. : 
On December 5, 1978, Martin L. Barr, Counsel to this Board, 
filed a charge alleging that the Westmoreland Noninstructional 
Employees' Service Organization (respondent) had violated 
Civil Service Law (CSL) §210.1.in that it caused, instigated, 
encouraged, condoned and engaged in a strike against the West-
moreland Central School District on October 25, 26, 27, 30, 31 and 
November 1, 1978. 
Prior to the expiration of respondent's extended answering 
time, respondent agreed to forego filing its answer, and thus 
admit to all offcthe allegations of the charge, upon the under-
standing that the charging party would recommend and this Board 
would accept a penalty of loss of its deduction privileges 
to the extent of fifty percent (50%) of that amount which would 
otherwise be deducted during a year.— The charging party has 
—' This is interidedftobe the equivalent of a fsix-mohth suspension 
;" o'f^ the privileges of dues and/or agency shop fee deduction, i.f 
any, if such were withheld in equal monthly installments 
throughout the year. In fact, the annual dues of the respon-
dent are hot deducted in this maimer-.'. 
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recommended a suspension of the respondent's deduction privileges 
to the extent of fifty percent (50%) of the annual amount of 
such deductions. 
On the basis of the unanswered charge, we find that the 
respondent violated CSL §210.1 in that it engaged in a strike 
as charged, and we determine that the recommenjieji„p_enal-ty__i.s_a_ 
reasonable one. 
WE ORDER that the deduction privileges of the Westmoreland 
Noninstructional Employees' Service Organization be suspended 
commencing as of September 1, 1979, and continuing for such 
period of time during which fifty percent (507o) of its annual 
dues and agency shop fee deduction, if any, would otherwise 
be deducted:/. Thereafter, no dues or agency shop fee 
shall be deducted on its behalf by the Westmoreland Central 
School District until the Westmoreland Noninstructional Employees' 
Service Organization affirms that it no longer asserts the right 
to strike against any government as required by the provisions of 
CSL §210.3(g). 
Dated: Albany.,. New York • 
February 2:2, .1979 
Harold R. Newman,Chai Chairman 
G&CU—/Cfajbisa-
I d a K l a u s , Member 
David C. R a n d i e s , Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of //2F-2/22/79 
JOHNSON CITY POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Respondent, BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
-and- CASE NO. U-3453 
-V-ILLAGE_.OE-J.OHNS.ON-C.ITY-, .-. 
Charging Party. 
EARL D. BUTLER, ESQ., for Respondent 
PETER PIRNIE, for Charging Party 
The charge herein alleges that the Johnson City Police Benevolent 
Association (PBA) did not negotiate in good faith in that it refused, upon the 
request of the charging party, to withdraw from interest arbitration a proposal 
for a nonmandatory subject of negotiation. The contested proposal provides: 
"Upon retirement of a member of the Johnson City 
Police Department, Blue Cross, Blue Shield and 
Major Medical (Metropolitan) Insurance shall 
be continued under the Group Plan with the Village 
paying 50% for employees cost and 35% for dependent 
cost. In accordance with the rules of New York State, 
Department of Civil Service, this coverage will not 
be cancelled at age 65. The insurance coverage 
stays in effect until the employee dies." 
The PBA has explained its proposal as not requiring insurance by a specific 
carrier. It does, however, insist that the arbitration panel make a determi-
nation on its proposal for the extension of health insurance to retired 
employees and their dependents until the death of the retired employee. 
Johnson City contends that there are two reasons why PBA committed an 
improper practice by insisting that the arbitration panel make a determination 
5641 
Board - U-3453 -2 
on this demand. First, it alleges that the demand is for a retirement benefit 
and, by that reason, is not a mandatory subject of negotiation. (Section 201.4 
of the Taylor Law, Incorporated Village of Lynbrook v. PERB 64 AD 2d 902 
[2d Dept., 1978].) Second, it alleges that the demand is for a benefit to be 
provided for a period of time exceeding two years and is, therefore, beyond the 
power of an arbitration panel to provide (Section 209.4 (c) (vi) of the Taylor 
Law) . 
The decision of the Appellate Division in Lynbrook v. PERB supports 
Johnson City's argument that the proposal is for a retirement benefit and 
therefore not a mandatory subject of negotiation. Accordingly, we do not find 
it necessary to reach the question whether a proposal for the duration of a 
benefit in excess of two years, such as that here involved, is beyond the 
authority of an interest arbitration panel. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER THE PBA to withdraw the contract proposal. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
February 23, 1979 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
tf^Ct.^ / C ^ K 
Ida Klaus, Member 
f4i.rl3L. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
//2G-2/22/79 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF CHEEKTOWAGA, 
Respondent,
 # BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
- and -
 # CASE NO. U-3182 
CHEEKTOWAGA POLTCE^CLUB~" INC.,
 # 
Charging Party. 
WEBER, WESTON, KANE & MOEN, Esqs., for Respondent 
DIXON AND DE MARIE, P.C., for Charging Party 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Town of Cheektowaga 
(Town) to a hearing officer's decision that it violated its duty to negotiate 
in good faith by refusing to execute a contract that it made with the 
Cheektowaga Police Club, Inc. (Police Club). The Town acknowledges it refused 
to execute the contract, but contends that the contract contains a clause to 
which it never agreed. 
FACTS 
The contract referred to in the charge is one designed to succeed an 
earlier contract that expired in December 1976. The Town and the Police Club 
agreed upon many terms of a successor contract, but they could not agree on . . 
others. Finally, in September 1977, the parties submitted the outstanding dis-
pute to interest arbitration under §209.4 of the Taylor Law. Among the 
provisions ostensibly resolved by agreement was §20.04 of the proposed suc-
cessor contract entitled, Police Radio Dispatcher. The Police Club asserts that 
the parties agreed, in April 1977, to the following: 
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"The Police Radio Dispatcher is to be paid at the 
same rate of pay as detective upon assignment to 
that position. [I]n order [to] calculate the 
dispatcher's salary, it would be presumed he is 
receiving senior patrolman's pay. 
The Police Radio Dispatcher must agree to remain 
in the position for 1 year. 
The Police Radio Dispatcher must be a Civil Service 
Police Officer." 
The Town asserts that it never agreed to the final sentence, "The Police Radio 
Dispatcher must be a Civil Service Police Officer". On the basis of the 
evidence in the record, the hearing officer accepted the position of the Police 
Club and ordered the Town to execute a contract containing the disputed sen-
tence . 
DISCUSSION 
We find that the record lacks important evidence. Section 205.4 of the 
Rules of this Board specifies the information that must be included in a 
petition to this Board requesting interest arbitration. To be included is a 
statement of each of the terms and conditions "that have been agreed upon." 
Section 205.5 of our Rules provides that the response to a petition requesting 
arbitration should "set forth respondent's position specifying the terms and 
conditions of employment that were resolved by agreement...." Those documents 
have not been made a part of the record in this case, nor has evidence been 
taken as to them. If properly completed, they should reflect the understanding 
of the parties in September 1977 as to whether they had an agreement on the 
provision numbered §20.04 and, if so, what that agreement was. Those documents 
and testimony related to them are relevant to the resolution of the factual 
issue before us. 
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Accordingly, we remand this proceeding to the hearing officer to reopen 
the record for the purpose of including the two documents, which are on file in 
the conciliation office of this Board, and receiving any related evidence that 
the parties may wish to submit. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
February 23, 1979 
^ ^ ^ /E/LM,, 
Harold S.. Newman, Chairman 
Klaus, Member Ida 
David C. Randies, Memb 
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STATE OF NEW YOP^ 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELAT, IS BOARD 
It 
#2H-2/22/79 
Case No. C-1668 
I n t h e M a t t e r of 
STATE OF NEW YORK (UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM), 
Employer, 
- and -
COURT OFFICERS BENEVOLENT. ASSOCIATION OF 
NASSAU COUNTY, 
Petitioner, 
- and -
NASSAU CHAPTER, CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION, 
I n t e r v ' e n o r . 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND.. ORDER. TO, NEGOTIATE. 
A r e p r e s e n t a t i o n p r o c e e d i n g h a v i n g b e e n c o n d u c t e d i n t h e 
a b o v e m a t t e r by t h e P u b l i c Employment R e l a t i o n s Board i n a c c o r d -
a n c e w i t h t h e P u b l i c E m p l o y e e s ' F a i r Employment Ac t and t h e 
\] R u l e s of P r o c e d u r e o f t h e B o a r d , a n d i t a p p e a r i n g t h a t a 
n e g o t i a t i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i v e h a s b e e n s e l e c t e d . 
P u r s u a n t t o t h e a u t h o r i t y v e s t e d i n t h e Boa rd by t h e 
P u b l i c E m p l o y e e s ' F a i r Employment A c t , 
IT I S HEREBY CERTIFIED t h a t COURT OFFICERS BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION OF NASSAU COUNTY 
h a s been, d e s i g n a t e d and s e l e c t e d by a m a j o r i t y o f t h e e m p l o y e e s 
"i o f t h e a b o v e named p u b l i c e m p l o y e r , i n t h e u n i t d e s c r i b e d b e l o w , 
I a s t h e i r e x c l u s i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f o r t h e p u r p o s e of c o l l e c t i v e 
I n e g o t i a t i o n s and t h e s e t t l e m e n t o f , g r i e v a n c e s . 
U n i t : I n c l u d e d : 
E x c l u d e d : 
A l l n o n - j u d i c i a l employees employed by •the System i n 
Nassau County and who, p r i o r t o A p r i l 1 , 1977, were 
employees of Nassau County and i n c l u d e d w i t h i n the ' 
b a r g a i n i n g u n i t d e f i n e d by t h e County of Nassau P u b l i c 
Employment R e l a t i o n s Board i n a " C e r t i f i c a t i o n of 
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e and Order t o N e g o t i a t e " i s s u e d i n 
Case No. R-007, dated" Oc tober 1 8 , 1968. 
A l l o t h e r employees . 
j . F u r t h e r , I T - I S ORDERED t h a t t h e a b o v e named p u b l i c e m p l o y e r 
j s h a l l n e g o t i a t e c o l l e c t i v e l y w i t h COURT OFFICERS BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION 
| OF NASSAU COUNTY 
' a n d e n t e r i n t o a w r i t t e n a g r e e m e n t w i t h s u c h e m p l o y e e o r g a n i z a t i o n 
; w i t h r e g a r d t o t e r m s and c o n d i t i o n s of e m p l o y m e n t , and s h a l l 
. n e g o t i a t e c o l l e c t i v e l y w i t h s u c h e m p l o y e e o r g a n i z a t i o n i n t h e 
j : d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f , and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f , g r i e v a n c e s . 
S i g n e d on t h e 22nd 
A l b a n y , New York 
d a y o f F e b r u a r y , 1 9 79 
&zt-^-. /£-^C*oc-~-
Ida Kiaus, Member-
David Cl. -'RarfdH 5646 
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SCHEDULE"A" 
COUNTY OF NASSAU 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF THE NASSAU CHAPTER, 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION, INC. 
AN EMPLOYEES' ORGANIZATION, FOR RECOGNITION AS 
THE DULY AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE OF CERTAIN 
DESIGNATED EMPLOYEES OF THE COUNTY OF NASSAU, 
A PUBLIC EMPLOYER. 
X A S E " N O T T R - 0 0 7 — — : — - — - — - ^ J 1 — ^ — — - : — ^ — ^ -
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
The Civil Service Employees' Association, Nassau County Chapter, 
having petitioned this Board for recognition and certification as the duly 
authorized employee organization to represent the public employees of the 
County of Nassau, in the unit hereinafter set forth, for the purpose of 
negotiating collectively on behalf of such employees with the County of 
Nassau, as the public employer, in the determination of their terms and 
conditions of employment and the administration of grievances arising 
thereinunder; and 
The Board, upon due consideration of such petition as well as of all of 
the facts and evidence submitted in the course of a full hearing, conducted 
pursuant to Section VIII of the Rules of Procedure of this Board, and the 
findings and recommendations of the Hearing Officer made in connection 
therewith, having determined, 
a) the Civil Service Employees' Association Nassau County Chapter, to 
bean employee organization within the meaning of Article 14, Section 201, 
of the Civil Service Law, and Nassau County Ordinance No. 228/1967, as 
amended, and 
b) the said employee organization to be qualified under all of the 
standards set forth in Section 207, of this the aforesaid Article 14, and 
Nassau County Ordinance No. 228/1967, as amended, for the deter-
mination of representation status, and 
c) the unit of employees contended for to be an appropriate one, and 
the Board having further determined, on all of the evidence submitted in 
behalf of the petitioner employee organization, that such proof was In-
sufficient to permit of certification without an election and for such reason 
and pursuant to Section VI of its Rules of Procedure, ordered that such an 
election be held under the direction and supervision of the American 
Arbitration Association, as the authorized agent of the Board for such 
purpose, and 
23 
(19; 
(20 
(21 
(22 
(23 
(25 
(26 
(27; 
(28 
(29 
(30 
(31 
(32 
(33 
(34; 
(35 
(36 
(37 
(38 
(39 
(40 
(41 
(42 
(43 
(44 
(45 
(46 
(47 
Director of the Children's Shelter 
Director of Family Services 
Parks Maintenance Superintendent 
Assistant Parks Maintenance Superintendent 
Superintendent of Parks 
Fire Marshal 
County Director of Safety 
Undersheriff 
S up e r-in-t-e n d e n't-of-H-i g hway-M ain teh an ce—~~—~— 
Assistant Superintendent of Highway Maintenance 
Director of Bureau Motor Equipment Management 
Superintendent of Building Maintenance 
Director, Bureau of Building Services 
Sewer Maintenance Superintendent 
Deputy Director, Bureau Purchase and Supply 
Director, Bureau Purchase and Supply 
County Director of Accounting 
Field Audit Director 
Superintendent of Real Estate 
Director, Motor Vehicle Bureau 
Director, Traffic Engineering 
Superintendent of Sewage Plants 
Administrative Officer I 
Administrative Officer li 
Chief Clerk, Board of Assessors 
Assistant Nursing Home Administrator 
Assistant Hospital Administrator I 
Assistant Hospital Administrator II 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with 
THE NASSAU CHAPTER, CIVIL SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION, INC. 
and if agreement is reached with regard to the terms and conditions of 
employment, and the determination and administration of griev»ices, 
such agreement shali be reduced to writing. 
Dated this 18th day of October, 1968 
at Mineola, New York. 
On behalf of the 
Public Employment Relations Board 
Milton Friedman 
Chairman 
Leonard Cooper 
Member 
Edward Regnell 
Member 
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